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Abstract  
We examine the economic and social determinants of suicide mortality in a panel of 25 OECD countries over 
the period 1970 – 2011 and explicitly analyze the effects of unemployment and labor market institutions on 
suicide rates. In line with a large body of literature, our results suggest that unemployment and social factors 
are important determinants of suicide mortality. The results also indicate that unemployment benefits 
decrease suicides of males, while relatively strict employment protection regulations increase suicide 
mortality. These findings indicate that labor market institutions may influence job satisfaction and the quality of 
life in industrial countries. We suggest taking into account the role of labor market institutions when analyzing 
the effects of institutional and economic determinants on health. 
Keywords: Suicide; Employment Protection; Unemployment Benefits; Labor Market Institutions; Panel 
Data; Fixed Effects Model; Random Effects Model. 
JEL Classifications: C 23, E 24, I 10, J 65 
 
1.   Introduction 
The empirical literature on the determinants of suicide mortality indicates that economic cycles affect suicide rates. 
Evidence presented for the United States (Ruhm, 2000), Japan (Kuroki, 2010), and Europe (Brainerd, 2001, Stuckler et 
al., 2011, and Breuer, 2015) show that higher unemployment increases suicide mortality.
1
 One stream of literature 
analyzes the correlation of macroeconomic variables on suicide mortality over time to discover the economic and social 
determinants of suicide mortality with fixed effects panel regressions (Ruhm, 2000, Brainerd, 2001, Andrés, 2005, Cylus 
et al. 2014). 
While a large share of literature confirms the positive relationship between unemployment and suicide mortality, the 
question of how unemployment affects suicide rates remains ambiguous. Hamermesh and Soss (1974) provide an early 
theoretical model of how economic factors may influence individual lifetime utility and the likelihood of suicide. 
According to them, it is conceivable that unemployment implies a decrease in lifetime earnings and utility to the 
unemployed share of the population. This negative influence of unemployment on utility would be particularly painful in 
the absence of a welfare system and in particular, without unemployment benefits. Following this theoretical 
consideration, it would be possible that higher unemployment benefits dampen the influence of unemployment on suicide 
mortality. In this regard, it would be worthwhile to analyze the role of employment protection legislation because this 
labor market institution provides insurance against unemployment risk for those who have a job. Despite the growing 
literature on the relation between unemployment and suicide mortality, there is little evidence that institutions influence 
this relationship. To the best of our knowledge, no study to date has analyzed the influence of unemployment benefits 
and employment protection legislation on suicide rates.
2
 In this paper, we reexamine the economic and social 
                                                          
1
 See Platt (1984) and Milner et al. (2013) for a review of the literature. 
2
 Cylus et al. (2014) don´t analyze the influence of employment protection legislation. 
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determinants of suicide mortality in a large panel of 25 OECD countries over the period 1970 - 2011. We contribute to 
the literature by explicitly analyzing the effects of labor market institutions on suicide rates. As compared to earlier 
analyses on suicide rates in OECD countries, we use an extended sample and considerably increase the number of 
observations.
3
 The enlargement of the sample size is particularly reasonable in view of the application of fixed effects 
panel regression models.
4
 Flaig and Rottmann (2013) stress the importance of using longer time series in analyses of the 
effects of labour market institutions to obtain more reliable estimates of the effect of employment protection, particularly 
by increasing within-country variations of employment protection (which was more pronounced in the 1970s than in the 
1980s and 1990s). In line with a large body of literature our results suggest that unemployment increases suicide 
mortality, while real economic growth tends to decrease suicides. The results also indicate that unemployment benefits 
decrease suicides of males, while relatively strict employment protection regulations have a positive influence on suicide 
mortality. The influence of labor market institutions on suicide mortality indicates that labor market rigidities might play 
a role for job satisfaction or for adverse effects on labor market outsiders. We suggest taking into account the role of 
labor market institutions when analyzing the effects of institutional and economic determinants on health. 
2.   Labor Market Institutions and Job Satisfaction 
From a theoretical perspective, unemployment benefits (in terms of net replacement rates) as well as employment 
protection legislation (EPL) may influence the effect of unemployment on suicide rates in different ways. First, it is 
conceivable that stricter employment protection legislation reduces the risk of unemployment for insiders. Higher 
replacement rates would compensate workers for the income-loss in case of unemployment and would dampen the 
income-loss during an economic crisis. In this case, the loss in utility might be small, what could influence the 
probability of suicides. 
Unemployment benefits and employment protection regulations are comparable to a public insurance system for 
employees against the risk of unemployment in a private market. Due to moral hazard and adverse selection problems, 
private markets do not offer sufficient safety in the face of unemployment. Therefore, industrialized countries have 
established more or less strict regulations on employment protection as well as unemployment benefits. Unemployment 
benefits provide, firstly, direct income to the unemployed, and secondly, insure the employed share of the population 
against the risk of income losses in case of unemployment. Employment protection rules, however, only offer safety and 
job security for those individuals who are already employed. Both institutions may help to mitigate the risk of income 
losses in the face of unemployment for employees and tend to smooth consumption over time. Accordingly, labor market 
institutions affect both the unemployed and the employed.  
On the one hand, unemployment benefits offer safety against the risks associated with unemployment. Given a generous 
unemployment insurance system, the disutility of unemployment decreases and jobholders as well as unions increase 
their reservation wage. This leads to a reduction of job search intensity. Search unemployment and the duration of 
unemployment is therefore higher (Boeri and van Ours, 2008, as well as Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004). Many studies 
confirm that generous unemployment benefits increase the average duration of unemployment (e.g. Katz/Meyer, 1991, 
Hunt, 1995, Lalive et al. 2006). Similarly, macroeconomic literature finds that long-term unemployment increases when 
unemployment benefits rise (Nickell, 1997 and 2003, Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000, and Bassanini and Duval, 2006). 
Both unemployment benefits and employment protection asymmetrically affect the composition of the workforce by 
pricing out woman, youths and older workers (Bertola et al., 2007). Empirical studies find mixed results with respect to 
the effects of employment protection on unemployment rates; however, many studies show a positive relationship 
between the strictness of employment protection and the duration of unemployment (Boeri/van Ours, 2008, 
Cahuc/Zylberberg, 2004). It is conceivable that long-term unemployment has a particularly detrimental effect on life 
satisfaction, which might also increase the rate of suicides. These findings are consistent with the theoretical argument 
that high firing costs reduce both job finding as well as the separation of employment, and therefore have an ambiguous 
impact on unemployment rates. Reduced job creation leads to smaller unemployment outflows and a longer average 
duration of unemployment. Additionally, strict employment protection might influence the composition of 
unemployment. Working-age males are usually seen as insiders in the labor market, while females and young people are 
more often considered as outsiders and hence are more vulnerable to the adverse effects of strict employment protection 
regulations.
5
 
                                                          
3
 For the majority of countries we exploit data on over 35 years. By comparison, related studies rely on relatively small 
samples. See, for example, Neumayer (2004), Andrés (2005) and Noh (2009) on the determinants of suicide mortality in 
cross country panel studies. 
4
 Under the assumption that the independent variables are weakly but not strictly exogenous, the inconsistency shrinks to 
zero at the rate 1/T, where T is the number of observations (Wooldridge, 2002 and Vogelsang, 2012). 
5
 See, for example, Agnello et al. (2014) on the effect of labor market flexibility on youth employment and long-term 
unemployment. 
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In addition to their negative consequences for outsiders, it is possible that strict labor market institutions will even harm 
people who are employed. Employment protection, for instance, is offered only to one fraction of the workforce, so that 
the risk of unemployment is particularly concentrated on those who are not covered by protection rules. Employment 
protection may thus have different effects on temporary and permanent employment. Beyond this, although the risk of 
unemployment declines for those who are protected, they are aware of the increase in the duration of unemployment 
under strict employment protection legislation. It is also conceivable that employers might use mobbing as a strategy to 
force their employees to leave the firm under strict EPL (Wasmer, 2006, and Boeris and van Ours, 2008). Agents with 
limited horizons could cling to non-satisfying jobs to avoid the short-run risk of unemployment. The adverse effects of 
strict labour market institutions can possibly be mitigated if EPL protects workers against arbitrary dismissals and 
therefore creates a more stable and trusty relation, making workers more willing to invest in firm- specific human capital. 
To sum up, strict EPL theoretically may have both positive and negative effects on job satisfaction and, thus, on an 
individual‘s inclination to commit suicide in times of unemployment, or even in employment. It may be true that strict 
labor market regulations may dampen the influence of economic crises on suicide mortality. Nevertheless, it is 
conceivable that generous unemployment benefits and strict EPL tend to establish long-term unemployment and decrease 
job satisfaction. The true relationship between labor market institutions and suicide behavior is thus an empirical 
question. 
3.   Data and Empirical Strategy 
The present study relies on cross-country data for a panel of 25 OECD countries over the period 1970 – 2011. The source 
of the data on suicide rates is the OECD Health Statistics Database. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for our dependent 
variables, gender-specific suicide rates (suicides per 100.000 inhabitants) for each country during the observation period. 
Data are not available for every country in each year, meaning that we show the numbers of observations for every 
country in column (2). For some countries (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Norway), data is available over the 
entire sample period 1970-2011, while some countries only provide data for a shorter period. The panel is unbalanced to 
exploit the full information available for every country and year. The table shows the mean, minimum, as well as the 
maximum for male and female suicide rates for every country, respectively. From the descriptive statistics, two 
statements can be established: first, suicide rates are considerably higher for men than for women; and second, suicide 
rates vary across countries. For male as well as for female suicide rates, the standard deviation across countries is bigger 
than the within-country standard deviation. Despite this fact, suicide rates show considerable variations within countries 
over time (see maximum and minimum in table 1). For instance, the average ratio between maximum and minimum for 
male (female) suicide rates is 1.7 (2.1). There are, obviously, clear differences in suicidal behavior of males and females. 
It would thus be appropriate to analyze the determinants of suicide rates for both genders separately and to try to identify 
the determinants of the cross-country distribution of suicide rates or to use cross-section fixed effects to exploit the 
variance of suicide rates over time. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, Suicide Rates Per 100,000 Inhabitants 
Country 
  
Male 
  
Female 
   Obs. Mean Min Max Mean Min Max 
Australia 6 19.40 17.20 21.90 4.98 4.40 5.30 
Austria 41 35.72 23.10 46.40 11.38 6.00 15.20 
Belgium 36 29.97 25.00 36.20 11.77 9.10 16.40 
Canada 30 20.86 16.30 25.00 6.00 4.80 8.20 
Czech Republic 11 25.04 22.20 29.20 4.94 4.00 6.40 
Denmark 41 28.78 14.60 45.40 13.97 4.70 23.60 
Finland 41 40.15 26.30 50.80 10.32 7.10 12.30 
France 38 30.66 25.20 38.00 10.33 8.00 13.30 
Germany 22 21.07 16.50 26.70 6.62 4.80 9.60 
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Greece 15 5.46 4.60 6.10 1.14 0.80 1.50 
Hungary 11 43.50 38.80 50.60 10.32 9.20 12.20 
Ireland 14 18.99 16.40 23.50 4.51 3.80 5.60 
Italy 36 11.54 9.10 14.00 3.66 2.40 4.70 
Japan 36 28.85 22.50 35.60 14.00 10.30 19.30 
Korea 7 39.79 27.90 45.10 15.99 10.30 19.30 
Netherlands 41 14.04 11.60 17.50 7.29 4.80 10.20 
New Zealand 36 20.24 13.80 24.80 6.57 4.30 9.10 
Norway 41 18.99 13.70 25.40 6.83 4.40 9.50 
Poland 11 27.37 24.20 29.50 4.25 3.60 5.00 
Portugal 38 16.10 9.00 21.30 4.28 1.90 6.40 
Spain 31 12.16 8.70 13.90 3.51 2.60 4.20 
Sweden 40 24.01 17.30 31.20 9.58 6.10 13.00 
Switzerland 40 31.52 18.10 39.60 11.82 6.50 15.80 
United Kingdom 31 11.78 10.10 13.50 4.04 2.80 6.80 
United States 37 20.97 18.50 22.90 5.54 4.10 7.90 
  
       All Countries        
Mean 
  
23.68 
  
8.14 
 Std. overall 
  
9.88 
  
4.21 
 Std. between 
  
9.76 
  
3.92 
 Std. within   4.22   2.20  
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for standard explanatory variables used in the suicide literature (e.g., Andres, 2005, 
Noh, 2009, Helliwell 2007). We include divorce rates and fertility rates because families provide a type of social 
integration and support. Divorces reduce family ties and as a result social integration drops. Moreover, Durkheim (1952) 
already found that having children sharply reduces suicide risk. Data on fertility rates (children per women aged 15 to 49) 
are obtained from the OECD family database, divorce rates (number of divorces per 1,000 inhabitants) are provided by 
the OECD social indicators. According to the economic theory of suicide developed by Hamermesh and Soss (1974) we 
should also include real GDP per capita and the proportion of the elderly population. The GDP growth rate is introduced 
to control for economic fluctuations. Population and population shares (65 years age and above) are obtained from the 
OECD labor force statistics. GDP per capita, unemployment, price indices and real GDP growth is taken from the OECD 
economic outlook no. 94. We compute comparable figures of normalized real GDP per capita for all OECD countries by 
dividing the value of nominal GDP per capita in US dollar (purchasing power parity) by the price index for the United 
States. Thus, income is measured in 100 dollar per capita. Furthermore, we consider the average male and female life 
expectancy to grasp the average public health level (health is an important determinant of life satisfaction). As discussed 
before, we are particularly interested in the relationship between unemployment, labor market institutions and suicide 
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rates, so we attach more importance to the discussion of these factors. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics, Explanatory Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Unemployment rate 731 6.32 3.64 0.00
*
 21.64 
Life exectancy, males 731 73.54 3.06 63.10 80.30 
Life expectancy, females 731 79.83 2.54 69.70 85.80 
Fertility 731 1.69 0.29 1.08 3.18 
Divorce rate 731 2.07 0.93 0.00
*
 5.30 
Share of population in age group > 65 731 14.12 2.53 7.20 20.80 
Real GDP per capita in 100 USD 731 253.96 74.43 85.85 564.85 
Real GDP growth 731 2.03 2.59 -10.75 14.59 
Gross replacement rate 731 27.61 14.42 0.00 65.00 
Gross repacement rate (GRRAPW) 622 27.34 14.34 0.00 65.00 
Employment protection  731 2.18 1.10 0.13 4.80 
Employment protection (EPLv1) 514 2.08 0.95 0.25 4.32 
 
*
 Smaller than 0.005 
Our main indicator for employment protection legislation (EPL) is obtained from the OECD (version 1 or EPLv1). Until 
2012, the OECD constructs the overall indicator (EPLv1) as a weighted sum of sub-indices, with a weight of 7/12 for 
employment protection for regular contracts and 5/12 for employment protection for temporary contracts. Since 2012 the 
OECD has only provided data on employment protection for both regular employment, or for temporary employment.  
Economic studies that rely on OECD labour market indicators suffer from a relatively low number of observations – 
annual data is available starting as of 1985 – limiting empirical research on the effects of employment protection over 
time.  
Another measure for employment protection legislation is obtained from Allard (2005). The Allard indicator includes 
annual data between 1950 and 2003
6
. This work is based on the OECD methodology and extended by reviewing the 
ILO‘s International Encyclopedia for Labor Law and Industrial Relations. Like the OECD indicator, the Allard measure 
takes into account regulations concerning individual dismissals and employment forms such as fixed-term employment 
and the supply of labour by temporary employment companies.  
The Allard indicator shows sharp increases in employment protection during the 1970s. For this reason it would be 
particularly interesting to extend the sample and to include this time period. Using the definition of the OECD indicator 
(version 1), we predict the missing values of the OECD indicator with the help of the Allard indicator, as follows: for the 
overlapping period (1985 to 2003), we estimate regressions between both indices with country dummies and a linear 
trend. Using the estimated regressions and the indicator proposed by Allard (2005), we predict the values for the EPLv1 
for years before 1985. The correlation coefficient between the predicted values and the OECD indicator is 0.99 over the 
period 1985 to 2003.
7
  
                                                          
6
 For the period between 1985 and 2000, the correlation between the Allard indicator and the OECD indicator (Version 
1) is 0.92. Version 2 and 3 of the OECD indicator are available only for years starting in 1998, which is why we rely on 
version 1 of the OECD indicator. 
7
 In a test for robustness, we use only the official OECD data over the period 1985 to 2011 and do not rely on predicted 
values. The results of the tests are provided in the appendix. 
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Gross replacement rates (GRR) are obtained from the OECD labor market statistics database and serve as a proxy for 
unemployment benefits
8
. 
Our empirical strategy is straightforward: as frequently applied in the literature on this topic (i.e. Ruhm, 2000, Brainerd, 
2001, Breuer, 2015), we use fixed effects panel regressions to analyze the determinants of suicide rates over time: 
                  (1), 
where     is the gender-specific suicide rate in country i at time t, and     are the explanatory variables of interest which 
include unemployment, variables that measure the influence of labor market institutions, as well as control variables, 
such as life expectancy and fertility. Since     may vary across countries because of unobserved country-specific factors 
(  ), the model is estimated using country-specific fixed effects. In principle, however, we can apply both, random as 
well as fixed effects models. The advantage of using a random effects model is that we can account for variations of the 
data both within and across groups. This allows us to derive efficient estimators under particular circumstances. The 
random effects model hinges on the assumption that the country-specific effects are independent from the explanatory 
variables. In contrast to the random effects model, the fixed effects model makes inferences based only on the within-
country variation of the data, implying that unobserved time-invariant differences across firms have no effects on the 
results. 
4.   Results 
Table 3 shows the results for the fixed effects and the random effects model for both males and females. In line with 
literature on this topic, we estimate the effects using log suicide rates as the dependent variable to adjust for skewness in 
the distribution. We multiply the log-value by 100 so that an estimated coefficient of 1 indicates an increase in the 
explanatory variable of one unit and coincides with an increase in the suicide rate of 1 percent. For instance, an increase 
in divorce rates by 1 case per thousand inhabitants increases the expected male suicide rate by 7 percent. If the 
unemployment rate increases by four percentage points, suicides increase by approximately 5 percent for males, and 9 
percent for females, respectively.
9
 The estimated parameters and their standard errors are very similar in both 
specifications. The 
2 -statistic of the Hausman test with 8 degrees of freedom is 14.07 with a p-value of 0.079. Should 
the idosyncratic errors it not be iid, however, the Hausman test may be biased, because the random effects model is 
inefficient. Arellano (1993) provides an alternative regression based test, using heteroskedastic- and cluster-robust error 
terms. The 
2 -statistic of this test with 8 degrees of freedom is 36.40 with a p-value smaller than 0.001, which clearly 
rejects the random effects assumptions. The results are similar for regressions using the suicide rate of females
10
. 
In the following regressions we thus rely on the fixed effects model. These results, however, are not very different from 
those obtained with the random effects models that use both within- and cross-country variations in the data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 The indicator is given in two versions (GRRAPW von 1961 to 2005 und GRRAW during 2001 and 2011). Version 1 
considers only workers, while version two incorporates total employment. (GRRAPW: Gross replacement rates 
calibrated to the average production worker / GRRAW: Gross replacement rates calibrated to the average worker). Both 
indicators are only given for uneven years. We compute values for even numbered years through linear interpolations. 
Afterwards, we combine both indices on gross replacement rates by calculating the ratio of GRRAPW/ GRRAW for each 
country and extrapolate the GRRAPW series multiplying the GRRAPW by the observed ratio for the year 2005. 
9
 The standard deviation of the unemployment rate amounts to four percent (see table 2). 
10
 For females, the Hausman test indicates a p-value of 0.09, whereas the robust version of Arellano reveals a p-value 
smaller than 0.001. 
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Table 3: Random Effects And Fixed Effects Models: Log Suicide 
 (1) 
male 
(2) 
male 
(3) 
female 
(4) 
female 
 RE FE RE FE 
Unemployment rate  1.216*** 1.281*** 2.162*** 2.253*** 
 (0.239) (0.239) (0.297) (0.298) 
Life expectancy -5.644*** -5.458*** -0.783 -0.734 
 (0.789) (0.809) (1.093) (1.107) 
Fertility -20.896*** -20.814*** -20.773*** -20.533*** 
 (2.921) (2.922) (3.865) (3.871) 
Divorce rate 7.039*** 6.535*** 7.025*** 6.536*** 
 (1.471) (1.488) (1.869) (1.889) 
GDP per capita (in 100$) 0.047* 0.049** 0.196*** 0.201*** 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.030) (0.031) 
Real GDP growth -0.448** -0.446** -0.516** -0.514** 
 (0.190) (0.189) (0.237) (0.237) 
Share above 65 years  1.515*** 1.659*** 0.696 0.854 
 (0.493) (0.497) (0.646) (0.651) 
Trend -0.270 -0.336 -2.936*** -2.986*** 
 (0.252) (0.263) (0.272) (0.279) 
Constant 711.479*** 698.166*** 303.043*** 298.523*** 
 (52.750) (54.083) (81.344) (82.196) 
N 731 731 731 731 
R² 0.437 0.437 0.561 0.561 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
The results presented hitherto are based on the presumption that the errors are homoskedastic and uncorrelated. In the 
following we relax these assumptions. The different levels of significance (fixed effects regressions in table 3 vs. table 4) 
point to the presence of non-independent and / or heteroskedastic errors.
11
 In that case, the micro-econometric literature 
on panel regressions usually applies cluster robust standard errors as proposed by Arellano (1987). Their validity, 
                                                          
11
 For example, the test for serial correlation in the idiosyncratic errors proposed by Wooldridge (2002) clearly rejects the 
null hypothesis of no serial correlation. 
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however, depends on the assumption of cross-sectional independence. While this assumption might be meaningful in the 
case of micro-econometric panel data for households or enterprises, it is controversial in the case of macroeconomic data, 
due to the presence of common macroeconomic and political shocks (Urbain and Westerlund, 2006, Hsiao, 2007). 
Ignoring correlations of disturbances over time and between countries causes biased statistical inferences, because the 
relevant information decreases if observations are inter-correlated (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, Hsiao 2007). 
The cross-sectional dependence (CD) test proposed by Pesaran (2004) tests the null hypothesis of zero dependence across 
the countries using an average of all pair-wise correlations from country-specific regressions. The average absolute 
correlation coefficient is 0.41 (0.38) for males, (females) and the null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence can be 
rejected at the 1% (5%) significance level.
12
 Therefore, we use the nonparametric covariance matrix estimator proposed 
by Driscoll and Kraay (1998), which produces heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that are robust to very 
general forms of spatial and temporal correlations.  
We show the results with robust Driscoll-Kraay (1998) standard errors in table 4, whereas we have used a maximum lag 
in the autocorrelation structure of 3.
13
 The literature often estimates the correlates of suicide rates using log suicide rates 
as the dependent variable. Studies that use suicide rates in levels (absolute values) as the dependent variable (i.e. Ruhm, 
2000) are less common. To test the robustness of the results, table 4 contains estimations using both absolute values, as 
well as a log of suicide rates as the dependent variables.  
Our benchmark regressions reinforce most of the earlier findings in the literature on the economic determinants of 
suicide mortality. Unemployment, in particular, tends to increase the incidence of suicides, while GDP growth is 
negatively associated with suicide mortality (table 4). The role of GDP per capita is particularly interesting. It turns out to 
influence suicides positively, which is contrary to theoretical considerations (See Hammermesh and Soss, 1974). 
However, literature on the issue points to a nonlinear relationship between income and suicide mortality.
14
 Other social 
determinants of suicide mortality turn out to be statistically significant, as indicated in table 4. 
Higher life expectancy and fertility decrease suicide rates, whereas higher divorce rates and a higher share of the 
population in the age group 65 (and above) tend to increase suicides. While most of these effects are statistically 
significant for both gender groups, life expectancy and the demographic structure turn out not to be statistically 
significant for the suicide rates of women.
15
 
  
                                                          
12
 The CD tests are computed using the Stata routine ―xtcsd‖ as proposed by De Hoyos and Sarafideis (2006). 
13
 Hoechle (2007) discusses the optimal lag length selection. His program xtscc uses the formula floor   2/94 T /100 as 
the maximal lag length. This would be 3. The standard errors with three lags increase on average by 5 percent, as 
compared to those calculated with two lags. The standard errors with four lags are very similar to those based on a 
maximum lag of three. 
14
 GDP per capita tends to negatively affect suicides in developing countries, however, has a positive influence on 
suicides at particularly high levels of GDP per capita. Kenny (1999 and 2006) suggests that there is no positive 
relationship between happiness and growth in rich countries. Durkheim (1952) argues that income tends to increase 
actual and perceived independence, and hence to reduce the familiar and social integration of the individual. On the other 
hand, economic crises increase, in his view, suicide rates because they disturb the social order. Daily et al. (2011) present 
empirical evidence that societies with relatively high GDP per capita and levels of happiness tend to have the highest 
suicide rates. The level of others' happiness may increase the suicide risk because relative concerns are important in the 
domain of feelings over income and wealth. See also Millner (2013) for a review of the literature. 
15
 The literature points to significant differences in the determinants of suicidal behavior for the male and female share of 
the population. See e. g. Helliwell (2007) for differences in gender specific suicide mortality and Kuroki (2013) on the 
influence of sex ratios on suicides. 
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Table 4: Benchmark FE Regressions: Suicide and Log Suicide 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Male 
level 
Male 
ln 
Female 
level 
Female 
ln 
Unemployment rate  0.218** 1.281*** 0.131*** 2.253*** 
 (0.094) (0.410) (0.044) (0.543) 
Life expectancy -1.300*** -5.458*** 0.067 -0.734 
 (0.262) (1.056) (0.129) (1.152) 
Fertility -5.314*** -20.814*** -1.882*** -20.533*** 
 (1.380) (5.362) (0.695) (6.306) 
Divorce rate 1.735** 6.535** 0.542 6.536** 
 (0.824) (2.774) (0.381) (2.724) 
GDP per capita (in 100$) 0.017*** 0.049** 0.017*** 0.201*** 
 (0.005) (0.024) (0.003) (0.032) 
Real GDP growth -0.136*** -0.446** -0.044*** -0.514*** 
 (0.050) (0.182) (0.015) (0.169) 
Share above 65 years  0.518** 1.659** 0.102 0.854 
 (0.206) (0.713) (0.087) (0.625) 
Trend -0.143* -0.336 -0.281*** -2.986*** 
 (0.082) (0.312) (0.032) (0.273) 
Constant 116.598*** 698.166*** 7.826 298.523*** 
 (18.613) (74.875) (9.952) (91.013) 
N 731 731 731 731 
R² 0.419 0.437 0.465 0.561 
Driscoll-Kraay robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
After reinvestigating the socio-economic determinants of suicide mortality in OECD countries, we show the results after 
incorporating the effects of labor market institutions in table 5. Therefore, we include the indicators for employment 
protection and for gross replacement rates (column no. 1 and 3 for males and females, respectively) on the right-hand 
side of equation (1). It turns out that employment protection appears to have a positive effect on suicide rates for both 
gender groups. If the indicator for EPL increases by one unit, suicide rates increase by approximately 13 percent for 
males, and 12 percent for females, respectively. The results are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Further, an 
increase in the gross rate of unemployment benefits of ten percentage points decreases male suicide rates by somewhat 
more than two percent, while the effect is positive for females, but only significant at the 10 % level. According to our 
theoretical considerations made above, it would be possible that the influence of labor market institutions vary with the 
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level of unemployment. 
Therefore, we investigate whether the interaction of labor market institutions and unemployment affects the results. In 
column no. 2 and 4 we include the interaction of unemployment and labor market institutions, both for employment 
protection and the gross replacement rate. The estimated coefficient of employment protection (without interaction) 
remains statistically significant in all specifications. The interaction term of employment protection and unemployment 
also has a significant positive parameter for female suicide rates, indicating that strict employment protection in 
connection with high rates of unemployment tends to increase suicide rates of women. These results would be in line 
with the hypothesis that employment protection has a particularly negative effect on outsiders (in this case: the female 
population when unemployment is at high levels). The estimated parameter of the gross replacement rate (without 
interaction) is negative and robust for men. The interaction of unemployment and gross replacement rates, however, is 
positive and statistically significant for the male population, so that the negative effect of unemployment benefits on 
suicide rates decreases with rising unemployment. For women, the results in column no. 3 indicate that the gross rate of 
replacement has a weakly significant positive effect. However, the effect disappears after incorporating the interaction 
term of unemployment and gross replacement rate. The different findings for both gender groups may reflect the different 
behavior in terms of their labor market participation of the husbands and wives in our sample (Cahuc/Zylberberg, 2004). 
Table 5: FE Regressions: Labor Market Institutions and Suicide 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Male Male Female Female 
Unemployment rate  1.484*** -0.032 2.346*** -0.290 
 (0.435) (0.963) (0.552) (0.923) 
Life expectancy -6.982*** -7.155*** -1.799* -2.351** 
 (0.826) (0.833) (1.028) (0.953) 
Fertility -21.765*** -22.656*** -17.379** -16.266** 
 (3.999) (4.303) (6.776) (7.440) 
Divorce rate 7.377*** 7.419*** 6.514*** 8.183*** 
 (1.904) (2.004) (1.820) (2.491) 
GDP per capita (in 100$) 0.054* 0.064** 0.194*** 0.192*** 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.024) 
Real GDP growth -0.460*** -0.445*** -0.475*** -0.453*** 
 (0.156) (0.153) (0.143) (0.138) 
Share above 65 years  2.625*** 2.622*** 1.875*** 2.296*** 
 (0.612) (0.623) (0.654) (0.557) 
Trend 0.193 0.193 -2.723*** -2.663*** 
 (0.254) (0.275) (0.299) (0.261) 
Gross replacement rate -0.228* -0.479*** 0.281* 0.107 
 (0.113) (0.124) (0.152) (0.265) 
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Employment protection 12.751*** 13.097*** 11.878*** 9.236*** 
 (1.488) (1.818) (1.850) (2.697) 
Interaction GRR  0.049**  0.036 
  (0.023)  (0.026) 
Interaction EPL  0.045  0.699* 
  (0.228)  (0.397) 
Constant 754.715*** 772.565*** 322.315*** 364.704*** 
 (52.535) (56.045) (84.711) (79.771) 
N 731 731 731 731 
R² 0.512 0.522 0.588 0.598 
Driscoll-Kraay robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
Interaction GRR = Unemployment rate * Gross replacement rate 
Interaction EPL = Unemployment rate * Employment protection 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
5.   Robustness 
We test whether our findings are robust using alternative definitions of the data. We use other specifications of the 
dependent variable, as well as alternative data on labor market institutions and rely only on data provided by the OECD.  
Table 6 depicts the results for males and females (column 1 and 2), where we use an alternative definition of the indicator 
for the gross replacement rate
16
. This variable is only available until 2005, so that the number of observations decreases. 
In column (3) and (4), we additionally include only the indicator of employment protection as provided by the OECD. 
This leads to another significant reduction in the sample size, since the OECD indicator is only available after 1985. The 
number of observations decreases to approximately 50% of the benchmark sample (table 4 and 5). The results are robust 
to these alternative definitions of our data, as well as to the big sample adjustments. The interactions of labor market 
institutions and unemployment are, however, not statistically significant, which is why we do not consider interaction 
effects in the regressions. Employment protection remains positively associated with suicides and statistically significant 
for both, men and women. Unemployment benefits reduce the suicide rate of men and in some specifications the negative 
influence of gross replacement rates on female suicide rates is also significant. The influence of other determinants 
(unemployment, life expectancy, fertility, GDP per capita, GDP growth) does not vary, as compared to the benchmark 
results. 
Table 6: Robustness with Alternative Institutional Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Male Female Male Female 
Unemployment rate  2.120*** 2.950*** 0.482* 1.108** 
 (0.454) (0.672) (0.246) (0.474) 
Life expectancy -7.126*** -2.413* -4.383*** -4.953** 
                                                          
16
 In this table we show the results only for the original data provided by the OECD (GRRAPW) and do not rely on the 
extended data using GRRAW. 
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 (0.859) (1.339) (0.957) (1.829) 
Fertility -21.105*** -20.804** -12.973** -25.646*** 
 (4.476) (7.880) (5.305) (8.031) 
Divorce rate 6.855*** 4.580* 3.899 0.756 
 (2.462) (2.290) (2.336) (2.439) 
GDP per capita (in 100$) 0.107** 0.211*** 0.095** 0.208*** 
 (0.041) (0.031) (0.040) (0.047) 
Real GDP growth -0.393** -0.499*** -0.564*** -0.172 
 (0.174) (0.181) (0.173) (0.336) 
Share above 65 years  2.912*** 1.924* 4.838*** 4.762*** 
 (0.799) (0.971) (0.792) (0.730) 
Trend 0.080 -2.748*** -1.456*** -2.709*** 
 (0.358) (0.270) (0.323) (0.313) 
Gross replacement rate -0.427*** 0.279 -0.304** -0.383** 
 (0.106) (0.241) (0.122) (0.142) 
Employment protection 14.647*** 12.283*** 7.232*** 15.590*** 
 (1.382) (2.721) (1.202) (2.955) 
Constant 750.333*** 372.895*** 593.161*** 573.786*** 
 (59.055) (108.463) (57.568) (144.090) 
N 622 622 405 405 
R² 0.470 0.541 0.582 0.562 
Driscoll-Kraay robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
In other estimations we include additionally time fixed effects, to control for unobserved macroeconomic shocks at any 
given time. The results are very similar to the benchmark regressions. An estimation, which includes only time and 
country fixed effects, however, results in a R² of 0.88 for the suicide rates, so that the share of variation used to estimate 
the effects of the social, economic and institutional determinants of suicide mortality decreases substantially. 
Nevertheless, the results remain robust, even after including time- and country fixed effects, and even with the random 
effects model. The estimated coefficients as well as the levels of significance are relatively similar to those in the 
benchmark regressions, with the exception that the estimated effect of the interaction of employment protection and 
unemployment for women turns out to be statistically insignificant. The size of the coefficient remains comparable to that 
shown in table 5.
17
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 Results of further tests for robustness are available from the authors. 
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6.   Conclusion 
Empirical research on the determinants of suicide mortality use fixed effects panel regressions to examine the 
relationship of social and economic variables and suicide mortality. The literature on this topic indicates a robust and 
statistically significant positive relationship between unemployment and suicide mortality. According to Hamermesh and 
Soss (1974), it is conceivable that unemployment decreases income, consumption, as well as utility and, thus, may lead 
to an increasing rate of suicides in the aftermath of an economic recession. A number of studies provide evidence 
showing that the recent economic crisis in southern Europe was accompanied by an increase in suicide rates.
18
 In this 
context, it is conceivable that some institutional factors may also influence suicide mortality. Higher unemployment 
benefits could, for instance, compensate workers in times of unemployment. The automatic stabilization of the social 
security system might mitigate the social consequences of economic cycles and help to smooth the impact of recessions 
on health. On the other hand, generous unemployment benefits may increase the average duration of unemployment and 
affect the composition of the workforce. Additionally, employment protection may decrease the risk of unemployment in 
an economic recession, but it could also reduce the chance of the unemployed finding a job. Accordingly, high 
unemployment benefits or strict employment protection might be detrimental to outsiders. Beyond their effects on 
unemployment and its composition, it is, thus, conceivable that labor market institutions influence suicide mortality. No 
study to date, however, has analyzed the effect of unemployment benefits and employment protection on suicide 
mortality. 
This paper reexamines the economic and social determinants of suicide mortality in a large panel of 25 OECD countries 
over the period 1970 to 2011. It contributes to the literature on the issue by extending the size of the panel and increasing 
the number of observations considerably. The paper explicitly analyzes the influence of labor market institutions on 
suicides. In line with a large body of literature, our results suggest that unemployment increases suicide mortality while 
real economic growth tends to decrease suicide rates. Our results also indicate that the net replacement rate tends to 
decrease suicides of the male population, while employment protection has a significant positive effect on suicide 
mortality. This result is in-line with earlier analyses on the relationship between social expenditures and well-being (e. g. 
Hessami, 2010). We suggest taking into account the role of labor market institutions when analyzing the consequences of 
economic and social determinants on mortality and health. Additionally, it would be recommendable to extend the focus 
of studies on the effects of labor market institutions, by analyzing their effects on mental health. This research could help 
to answer a number of recent questions on, for example, how to reform labor market institutions in the aftermath of the 
euro crisis (Bentolila et al., 2012, and OECD, 2013). Since the financial crisis, policy-advisors have suggested 
liberalizing labor markets in countries, such as in Greece, Italy and Portugal. In view of our results, reducing employment 
protection would seem a better way of liberalizing labor markets than decreasing unemployment benefits.
19
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